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Articles

WHAT DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT
RESTRICT? A COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
ANALYSIS
Carl T. Bogus*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the collective rights model, the Second
Amendment only grants people the right to keep and bear arms
within the militia. Moreover, the Amendment does not apply to
private militias but only to the militia organized by Congressthat is, to the National Guard. This seems to give the Amendment very little bite. We are accustomed to thinking of the Bill
of Rights as granting individuals broad, meaningful rights against
governmental interference. The entire notion of a right is something one is entitled to even though the majority, through its
elected representatives, decides otherwise. Thus, we have the
right to speak and worship as we desire even if the government
decides such speech or religious worship is harmful to the community; we have the right to a jury trial in certain circumstances
even if the government decides that there are better ways to discover the truth. What kind of right is it, then, that gives individuals the right to keep and bear arms only within an entity organized and controlled by the government itself? After all, the
government decides who is in the National Guard, and no one
questions the National Guard's ability to regulate-fully and absolutely- the possession and use of weapons by its members in
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. The author wishes to thank Michael C. Dorf, Saul Cornell, and participants in the Symposium on Guns, Crime and Punishment in America at the University of Arizona College of Law, where an earlier version of this paper was presented, for their helpful comments. Copyright 2002 by Carl T.
Bogus. All rights reserved.
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their military capacities. Does the collective rights model therefore render the Second Amendment meaningless?
This question has enormous significance in the debate between those who believe the Second Amendment grants a collective right and those who believe it grants individuals a right to
keep and bear weapons for their own purposes, outside and irrespective of militia membership. 1 Advocates of the individual
rights model can justifiably argue that an interpretation of the
Amendment that renders it meaningless should be disfavored. 2
Admittedly, it is theoretically possible that the Second Amendment had meaning in 1791 but that over the past two hundred
and ten years it has become an anachronism. It is also possible,
as some have argued, that the right is presently dormant but may
reawaken in the future. 3 Nevertheless, it is an accepted canon of
constitutional construction that when two possible interpretations of a provision are available, we should generally avoid the
one that renders the provision meaningless or purposeless.4
Therefore, the collective rights model is weakened if it drains the
Second Amendment of any kind of practical utility or meaning.
This criticism cuts with greatest force if the collective rights
model renders the provision meaningless in 1791, of course.
Still, the criticism retains at least some rhetorical power if the
model renders the provision meaningless today, even if it has
been primarily the passage of time that has drained the amendment of practical significance.
I do not believe that this is the case however. Although the
Second Amendment grants only a collective right, it had genuine
meaning with potential real-world consequences in 1791, and it
still does today. However, I submit that the proper reading of
the Amendment is not the one it is generally given. In this paper
I shall explore the question of what vitality the collective rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment has todayspecifically, what restrictions the Amendment places on government activity at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
I. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship:
A Primer, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev.3 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect").
3. See e.g., H. Richard Uviller and William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in
Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 403 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Massachusetts Assn. of Health Main. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176,
181 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[a]ll words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning
and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render
statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.") (citation omitted).
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II. THE COLLECfiVE RIGHTS MODEL
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. " 5 All serious readers of the Second Amendment recognize that the Second Amendment is tied to the militia. Individual rights advocates downplay that connection, often by use of two techniques.
First, some suggest the prefatory phrase merely explains why the
right is granted but does not define it- that is, that the Amendment is to be given exactly the same meaning as if the first thirteen words did not exist. Second, some individual rights advocates argue the Founders believed in a universal militia that in
eighteenth century America included all adult, white males, and
in contemporary America would include all adults. Both of
these arguments drive to the same conclusion: every adult
American has a right to ke~p and bear arms, regardless of
whether one actually serves in the militia.
Several problems arise in these arguments however. First
and foremost, the Founders as a whole did not believe in a universal militia. Notwithstanding popular myth and Fourth of July
rhetoric, the militia was a flop in the war against the British.
General Nathaniel Greene explained why:
People coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life are not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to
stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over dead men,
to hear without concern the groans of the wounded, I say few
men can stand such scenes unless steeled by habit and fortified by military pride. 6

So often did the militia turn and run in the face of the enemy
that it became Continental Army doctrine to position militia
forces in front of and between Continental Army regulars, who
were given strict orders to shoot the first militiamen to bolt.
After the Revolutionary War the Founders were divided on
how the militia should be organized. While some continued to
favor a universal militia, others-including Alexander Hamilton,
for example-had become convinced that only a select, highly
trained militia would be useful. At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the Founders decided the Constitution
5. U.S. Const., Amend. II.
6. See John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard 43 (MacMillan, 1983).
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should not permanently decide how the militia should be organized; rather, this was to be a policy question left up to Congress.
Hence, Congress was given the authority to organize the militia
as it saw fit, with the ability to change the composition of the militia as the passage of time and circumstances may demand. 7
Individual rights advocates face another problem when they
attempt to read the Amendment in a way that essentially ignores
the prefatory phrase. This too violates the canon of constitutional construction that provisions should be read in a way that
gives every phrase and every word operative meaning. We are
to presume that the drafters inserted each and every word deliberately, intending that nothing be superfluous or without purpose.8 This canon presents considerable difficulty for an interpretation treating the first thirteen words of the Amendment as
a mere annotation explaining why the Founders decided to write
the next fourteen words.
The argument that the word militia in the Second Amendment should be read to mean a universal militia consisting of all
adult citizens has even greater-indeed, fatal-problems. Another fundamental canon of construction provides that the Constitution is to be read as a whole. 9 Amendments are not to be
treated as isolated provisions but as integral parts of the entire
document. 10 Moreover, when a word is repeated it is presumed
to have the same meaning in each place; thus, when in one instance a word may be susceptible to different meanings, but in
another has a definite meaning, we should presume the word
was used in the same sense in both places. 11 When we combine
this canon with the facts that (1) Madison was the principal
drafter of both provisions and clearly knew how militia was defined in the main body of the Constitution, (2) the Founders expressly stated that they had decided not to resolve the universal
7. The belief in a universal militia did not last long however. Indeed, the belief in
the militia as an effective military force-whether universal or select-also did not last
long. In his first presidential address, Jefferson said that "a well-disciplined militia [is]
our best reliance in peace, and for the first moments of war, till regulars relieve them."
But the state militias were so ridiculous at annual musters-often drunk and disorderly,
and abysmal shots-that states made it unlawful to mock them during musters. By his
second term Jefferson had given up, declaring that the nation "would have to settle for a
standing army."
8. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Succession of
Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), reh'g denied (Nov. 4, 1993); State ex reL Upchurch v.
Blunt, 810 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. Bane 1991).
9. E.g., Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388,391 (Ky. 1952).
10. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. King, 91 N.E.2d 785,788 (Ind. 1950).
II. E.g., House v. Cullman County, 593 So.2d 69, 72 (Ala. 1992).
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militia versus select militia debate but to entrust this as a policy
question for Congress, and (3) Madison stated that nothing in
the Bill of Rights was in any fashion designed to alter the main
body of the Constitution, the argument that militia means all
adult citizens cannot reasonably be maintained.
This brings me back to the collective rights model. Why
provide, on the one hand, that Congress can organize the militia
as it sees fit-deciding who serves in the militia, and regulating
possession and use of weapons in militia service-and on the
other hand state that the people have a right to keep and bear
arms within the militia? A little background is necessary to answer that question.
As I have explained in detail elsewhere, 12 and will only
briefly state here, I believe Madison wrote the Second Amendment to assure the South that Congress-which had just been
given the lion's share of authority over the state militia in the recently-ratified Constitution-would not use that power to undermine the slave system. In part, this was an amendment to the
slave compromise in the Constitution. At the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia, southern delegates made it clear the
subject of slavery was not negotiable: either the North 13 would
agree not to attempt to abolish slavery or the southern states
would walk away from Philadelphia and a Union with the North.
The result was an obscurely stated constitutional compromise.
While scrupulously avoiding the words "slave" and "slavery,"
the Constitution prohibited Congress from abolishing the African slave trade until 1808 or imposing an import tax of more
than ten dollars per slave. It also required that runaway slaves
escaping across state lines (and into free territory) be returned to
their owners. And it provided for counting slaves as three-fifths
of free persons for the purposes of apportioning congressional
representation and direct taxation.
The southern delegates told their constituents that, most
importantly of all, the Constitution did not grant Congress any
authority to abolish slavery, and that the northern delegates conceded this was the case. But not everyone was satisfied. During
the ratification debates, southern anti-Federalists argued that by

12. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 309 (1998).
13. New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and the New England states were then referred to as the Eastern states. To avoid confusion, I refer to them as the North or the
northern states.

490

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:485

giving Congress the power to organize and arm the militia 14 and
to call them into federal service, 15 the Constitution gave Congress the means to undermine the slave system indirectly. Congress might either disarm the militia or physically remove them
from a state, thus leaving the white population vulnerable to
slave revolt. It was a frightening prospect.
I believe that when Virginia sent Madison to the first Congress, Madison sought to correct part of this problem by writing
the Second Amendment. Madison's objective was to strengthen
the slave compromise by adding another provision to the militia
clauses of the Constitution. Madison wanted to make it clear
that although Congress had the authority to arm the militia, it
could not disarm the militia, at least not entirely. Put somewhat
more succinctly, the states were to have a right to armed militias.
This makes sense once one understands that the principal, and
from Madison and the South's point of view, critical function of
the militia was slave control. That had been true before and during the Revolution, and it remained true afterwards. In 1734, for
example, South Carolina officially declared that slave patrols
took precedence over other militia functions. 16 In 1756, Charles
Pinckney, chief justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
reported that the colony's militia was unreliable for any function
other than slave control. 17 During the Revolutionary War, the
South often refused to commit her militia to the war against the
British, fearing the absence of the militia left it exposed to slave
revolt. 18
If the states were to have the means to provide for their own
security, they needed an armed militia. This did not mean the
states had a right to a fully armed populace; indeed, the idea of
everyone having arms was anathema at the time. Nor did it
mean the states rather than the federal government were to have
14. The Constitution gives Congress the power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
15. The Constitution gives Congress the power:
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
16. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America 151 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).
17. Id. See also M.E. Bradford, Founding Fathers 194 (U. Press of Kansas, 2d ed.
1994) (noting that Pinckney was chief justice of South Carolina).
18. See Michael A. Bellesfles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States 17601865 at 83 J. Am. Hist. 425,429 (1996).
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the right to regulate arms within the militia. Congress continued
to have the authority to discipline, that is, regulate, the militia,
with the new qualification that it could not wholly deprive a state
of an armed militia and thus the means of providing for its own
security.
One might ask why-if the Second Amendment essentially
means that the states have a right to an armed militia-the
Amendment does not say that directly rather than referring to a
"right of the people to keep and bear Arms." The answer has to
do with how the militias were armed in colonial America. Today, of course, weapons in the hands of the National Guard are
furnished by the government; but that was not the case in colonial America. Guns were extremely expensive, and the colonies
could not afford them in great numbers. The attempted solution
was to require militia members to furnish their own arms or to
require others to do so on their behalf. For example, when Connecticut enacted its first militia act in 1637, it made the towns responsible for supplying firearms and munitions to militia members.19 But the firearms were too expensive and the towns
largely ignored the law, preferring the occasional small fines that
the Connecticut General Court imposed for non-compliance? 0
When Congress enacted the first militia act in 1792 it required
militia members to arm themselves? 1
State laws also made it clear that all firearms were essentially governmental property whether purchased privately or
supplied by a public body. The government could regulate
whether guns were to be kept at home or in an armory, whether
they could-or must-be carried when on public business, and
under what circumstances they could be used. State legislatures
enacted statutes giving government officials the right to expropriate and redistribute all firearms and ammunition, including
arms individuals had purchased themselves, as necessary to deal
with crises.22 As Michael A. Bellesiles writes: "[T]he government reserved to itself the right to impress arms on any occasion,
either as a defensive measure against possible insurrection or for
use by the state. No gun ever belonged unqualifiedly to an individual. "23 Therefore, though today a right of the people to keep
and bear arms within a government regulated militia seems like
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Belleslles, Arming America at 77 (cited in note 16).
ld.
See Perpich v. Dep't. of Def, 496 U.S. 334,350 (1990).
See Bellesiles, Arming America at 70-80 (cited in note 16).
Id. at 79.
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an oxymoron, such a right made sense when the militia was
armed by weapons in the hands of the people.
I submit, therefore, that even though the Amendment protects a right of the people, in contemporary terminology it provides the states with a right to an armed militia. The Amendment is properly seen as qualifying, though not essentially
altering, the militia provisions in the Constitution. Congress has
the authority to organize the militia but not to organize it out of
existence, the right to arm the militia but not the right to disarm
it entirely, the right to call the militia into federal service but not
to do so in ways that unduly jeopardize a state's security. I say
"unduly jeopardize" because national security may both transcend and subsume state security. Calling forth the militias to
repel an invasion on, say, the southern border might be justified
even though it left the New England states defenseless against
local insurrection, because the invasion would ultimately
threaten the security of the all the states.
Needless to say, this is not how the Second Amendment is
generally analyzed. Over the last half of the twentieth century,
at least, we have become accustomed to thinking about whether
the Amendment prohibits gun control legislation affecting the
general population. But, I submit, a correct interpretation of the
Amendment focuses instead on the militia. The correct question
is whether the Second Amendment restricts federal control of
the militia, and if so, how. Such restrictions may be modest but
nonetheless significant. This is not a new view. One history of
the National Guard, for example, states simply that the Second
Amendment "was intended to prevent the federal government
from disarming the militia. "24 But it is becoming something of a
forgotten view.
Ill. FOUR CASE HISTORIES
What then are some of the circumstances that would raise
genuine Second Amendment issues? This section presents four
historical episodes for consideration, which I offer as real world
examples of the kind of federal action to which the Second
Amendment is germane. In the following section (section IV), I
will offer some observations about whether, when faced with

24. U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Pub. No. A-124, The
National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States 8 (1993) (footnote omitted) ("Defending the Nation").
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cases arising out of these incidents, the courts should have found
that the federal action did violate the Second Amendment.
A. PROHIBITING MILITIA IN THE FORMER CONFEDERATE
STATES (1867)
After the Civil War, former Confederate Army regiments in
the southern states began to reconstitute themselves as state militia units. They often wore Confederate Army uniforms, carried
the Confederate battle flag, and intimidated emancipated slaves.
This alarmed Republicans in Congress, and on February 26,
1867, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts introduced an
amendment to the army appropriations bill then pending in
Congress. Wilson's amendment read in its entirety:
And be it further enacted, That all militia forces now organized
or in service in either of the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas, further organization, arming, or calling
into service of the said militia forces, or any part of thereof, is
hereby prohibited under any circumstances whatever until the
25
same shall be authorized by Congress.

A debate ensued, focused in part on whether depriving the
states of their militias would violate the Second Amendment.
Senator Virginia Senator Waitman T. Willey of West Virginia
said:
It seems to me that this is a very sweeping provision, and
which can only be justified I imagine by some very pressing
public urgency or necessity, to deprive these States of the use
of their militia for the purpose of maintaining their police
regulations in many places. The disability, as I understand the
amendment, is total; the whole of the militia organizations of
these States is to be entirely destroyed; the militia of the
States are not to bear arms in any event or under any condition. It strikes me that it is assuming to Congress a very extraordinary power, one which none but the most extreme necessity would justify. It may be well imagined that there may
be instances when it would be necessary, for the best of purposes, to keep the peace of the State, to maintain proper police regulations, that the militia should at least carry arms to a
limited extent. It strikes me also that there may be some constitutional objection against depriving men of the right to bear

25.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1848 (1867).
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arms and the total disarming of men in time of peace? 6

Senator Wilson defended his proposal by arguing that it
would prohibit the formation of militia units but not the enforcement of police regulations by other authorized officials.
More important for our purposes, Wilson also argued the ban on
militia was to be only temporary. Once "matters are settled," he
said, "these States will be at liberty to organize their militia as
the other States do." 27 After Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of
Indiana (who would later be Vice President under President
Grover Cleveland) also contended that the provision violated
the Second Amendment, Wilson offered a compromise: He was
willing to strike out the word "disarmed." 28 Willey graciously rejected the offer, however. Although he said he found the
amendment less offensive with the word deleted, Willey stated
he would vote against the measure nonetheless because it still
prevented "the arming and employment" of militia forces.
The amendment passed 23 to 11. President Andrew Johnson wanted to veto the measure but could not do so without vetoing the entire army appropriations act and de~riving the Army
of funds and Union soldiers of their salaries. 9 He therefore
signed it under protest, sending Congress a message protesting
the portion of the Act that, in his words, "denies to ten States of
the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves, in any
emergency, by means of their own militia. " 30
B. FEDERALIZING THE ARKANSAS NATIONAL GUARD (1957)

Two years before the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the city of Little Rock, Arkansas had already designed a seven-year school integration
26. Id. Some may seize upon Willey's phrase "depriving men of the right to bear
arms" rather than depriving the state of an armed militia as evidence that Willey envisioned the Constitution as protecting an individual right to bear arms rather than the collective right of the states to have armed militias (emphasis added). In my judgment,
however, it would be a mistake to attach too much significance to Willey's imprecise use
of language. After all, the amendment did not disarm individuals; it prohibited militias
forces.
27. Id. at 1849.
28. Id. "Of course," he added, "in time of war people bearing arms in hostility to
the Government would not be protected by this provision of the Constitution."
29. See Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 108 (cited in note 6);
Albert Castel, The Presidency of Andrew Johnson 113 (The Regents Press of Kansas,
1979).
30. Message from the President of the United States to House of Representatives
Transmitting Notice of Signing the Army Appropriations Bill, 40th Cong., 1st Sess.,
March 2, 1867.
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plan. 31 The plan had been devised under the leadership of the
city's mayor, Woodrow Mann, and was approved by the school
board. Litigation was filed challenging the plan as proceeding
too slowly but the federal court disagreed, approving the school
board's plan but retaining jurisdiction to ensure the plan in fact
moved with all deliberate speed. The plan was to begin in 1957
with the admission of 25 black students to the city's 2,000student Central High School.
Everything was expected to proceed smoothly until Marvin
Griffin, the governor of Georgia, came to town and gave a fiery
speech attacking school integration. Griffin's speech found an
enthusiastic response in certain quarters, stimulating Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus to seize on the issue as a means of improving his political fortunes. Faubus, a colorless individual with
declining popularity, was in the middle of his second two-year
term. He faced a daunting task in trying to win re-election because Arkansas had a strong tradition against governors serving
for more than two terms.
Faubus' opening gambit was to call Deputy Attorney General William Rogers to ask what the federal government could
do to prevent violence when the integration plan went into effect
in September. Rogers told Faubus that local disorders were
generally the province of the local police, but he dispatched the
head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice,
who happened to be an Arkansas native, to Little Rock to find
out what was going on. When this official asked Faubus why he
expected violence, Faubus said his intelligence was "too vague
and indefinite to be of any use to a law enforcement agency," 32
and Faubus was otherwise sufficiently strange and elusive to lead
federal officials to suspect that Faubus, himself, was going to try
to stir up trouble.
In August, a white woman filed a state court action seeking
to enjoin the integration plan because, she claimed, it would lead
31. For the description of the Little Rock episode, I draw heavily on two works:
Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 228-43 (Basic Books,1994), and William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream· A Narrative History of America 1932-1972 at 978-90
(Little, Brown & Company, 1973). I also consulted Taylor Branch, Paning the Waters:
America in the King Years 1954-1963 at 222-25 (Simon and Schuster, 1988); Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 224-25 (cited in note 6); Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower 550-54 (Random House, 1999); Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D.
Eisenhower 150-55 (U. Press of Kansas, 1991). Where sources have differed, as they
have in a number of details, I relied on Jack Greenberg's account generally and John K.
Mahon's account of military matters.
32. See Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 800 (cited in note 31).
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to violence. Faubus is assumed to have been the moving force
behind the lawsuit; he personally testified in the proceeding,
stating that revolvers had been found in the possession of both
black and white students. The state court granted the injunction.
However, at the request of the Little Rock school board the federal district court promptly dissolved that injunction and prohibited the state court from interfering in the desegregation of the
schools.
There were, in fact, no genuine omens of violence. Nevertheless, Mayor Mann and the city police force worked out contingency plans to control demonstrations, should that be necessary. They did not expect trouble, however, and were confident
the 175-member city police force could handle it should it occur.
On the evening before the school term was to begin, Faubus
appeared on Little Rock television to announce that the city was
plunging into violence. Local stores were selling out their supply
of knives, "Mostly to Negro youths," he said. "[T]he evidence of
discord, anger, and resentment has come to me from so many
sources as to become a deluge," so he had called out the Arkansas National Guard "to maintain or restore the peace and good
order of this community." 33 He had directed the Guard to prevent black students from entering the school because, he said, if
they did, "Blood will run in the streets." 34 An hour before Faubus spoke, National Guard troops, bearing M-1 rifles with fixed
bayonets, had already surrounded Central High School.
Faubus' claims of impending violence were bunk. The FBI
checked one hundred stores and found that knife sales were below normal levels. Mayor Mann said there had been no indication whatsoever of possible violence. And three other Arkansas
towns peacefully integrated on that same day.
The school board asked the black students not to attempt to
enroll the next morning and returned to federal district court for
instructions. The judge ordered the board to proceed with its
plan. On September 4, parents of only nine of the 25 black students who were scheduled to be enrolled permitted their children to attempt to go to school. Faubus had finally generated
his mob. As they approached the school, the black students
were jostled by angry segregationists screaming racial epithets.
Nevertheless, accompanied by white and black ministers, the
students made their way to the National Guard perimeter, where
33.
34.

Id. at 801.
Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts at 229 (cited in note 31).
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they were confronted by a solid wall of Guardsmen and told,
"Governor Faubus has placed this school off limits to Negroes."35
The federal district judge made Faubus a defendant in the
case and ordered him to appear in court on September 20th to
show cause why he should not be enjoined from obstructing the
enrollment of black students at the high school. Federal marshals proceeded to the governor's mansion, where they passed
easily through a perimeter of National Guardsmen to hand the
Governor a subpoena to appear in court.
At this juncture, Faubus sought presidential help. In response to a question at a press conference two months earlier,
President Eisenhower had said, "I can't imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to send federal troops ...
into any area to enforce the orders of a federal court, because I
believe that [the] common sense of America will never require
it. "36 Perhaps this led Faubus to believe the President would
commit to not using troops to enforce federal court orders. Faubus flew to Rhode Island for a personal meeting with President
Eisenhower at the summer White House in Newport. He did
not get want he wanted. Eisenhower reiterated what he told
Faubus by telegram several days earlier, namely, that "[t]he only
assurance I can give you is that the federal constitution will be
upheld by me by every legal means at my command. " 37
On September 20th, the federal court enjoined Faubus and
the Arkansas National Guard from obstructing black students
from attending the high school. The order explicitly stated that
the governor retained his authority to use the National Guard to
maintain peace and order. Peace and order were not what Faubus had in mind, however, and he withdrew the Guard entirely.
When the Little Rock police arrived at Central High School
at 6:00 A.M. on September 23rd to secure the area for the enrollment of black students that morning, they found themselves
confronting an ugly mob. The police cleared vital areas with
swinging nightsticks and erected sawhorse barricades. At 8:45
A.M. someone in the crowd screamed, "Here come the niggers,"38 and the crowd overran the police to chase and beat four
blacks who, as it happened, were not students but reporters.
35.
36.

37.
38.

Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 801 (cited in note 31).
Perret, Eisenhower at 508 (cited in note 31 ).
Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 981 (cited in note 31).
Id. at 803.
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During this spectacle, the nine black students slipped unnoticed into the school. Once inside, they had a relatively easy
time of it. No white students displayed hostility; some made
friendly advances. Meanwhile, matters outside continued to deteriorate. Attracted by news broadcasts, the mob swelled to
nearly a thousand. In late morning, the crowd surged forward,
overrunning the police and demolishing their barricades. As the
mob reached the doors of the school, a now very worried Mayor
Mann removed the black students from the school. The next
morning he sent President Eisenhower a telegram in Newport.
It began: "Immediate need for federal troops is urgent," 39 The
mob was even larger than yesterday, armed, and violent. "Situation is out of control and police cannot disperse the mob," it continued. "I am pleading to you as President of the United
States ... to provide the necessary federal troops" to restore
peace and order.
Eisenhower was already aware of the situation. The day before his staff had prepared a presidential proclamation titled
"Obstruction of Justice in the State of Arkansas" and providing
for the use of federal troops, but the President had not yet
signed it. He did so now. That night he went on national television to explain his action to the American people. "The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty
that the President and the executive branch of government will
support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the federal courts, even, when necessary, with all the means at the
President's command," he said. 40
The next day President Eisenhower signed a second proclamation authorizing the Secretary of Defense to call the entire
10,000-member Arkansas National Guard into active federal
service. Eisenhower was careful not to transmit this order
through the normal channel, that is, the Governor of the state.
The President placed Major General Edwin A. Walker in command and ordered him to ensure that the order was communicated directly to the Guardsmen.
Eisenhower did not nationalize the Arkansas National
Guard in order to use them, at least not as his principal means of
restoring order. The main objective was to deprive Faubus of
the Guard. The main federal force was a thousand paratroopers
39. Parret, Eisenhower at 552 (cited in note 31). For stylistic purposes, I have rendered the telegram in capital and small letters, although, as telegrams are, the original
was entirely capitalized.
40. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 805 (cited in note 31).
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from the elite 101st Airborne Division, who were flown in transport planes from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Arkansas. Nevertheless, as John C. Mahon writes, federalizing the Arkansas N ationa! Guard "created a situation without precedent: it directed
the Guardsmen to disregard their state commander-in-chief and
obey the commands of the president at a time when they were
on active state duty." 41
Southern politicians fiercely denounced Eisenhower's actions. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia said Eisenhower was
employing the tactics of Hitler's storm troopers. Senator Olin
Johnson of South Carolina urged Faubus to challenge Eisenhower's authority over the Guard. "If I were Governor Faubus,
I'd proclaim an insurrection down there, and I'd call out the National Guard, and I'd then find out who's going to run things in
my state," he said. 42 Faubus did not do so, however. He referred to the military units as "occupation forces," 43 and claimed
they were guilty of all manner of outrages, including bludgeoning innocent bystanders and poking bayonets into the backs of
schoolgirls with "the warm, red blood of patriotic Americans
staining the cold, naked, unsheathed knives. " 44 The accusations
were, of course, hokum. There were confrontations between
troops and the mob, during which one man who tried to seize a
paratrooper's rifle was hit with a steel butt of an M-1. The students were enrolled and protected.
After the initial period, General Walker discharged all of
the Arkansas National Guard (who, for the most part, had been
required to spend the days in their armories), except for a special
task force of 1,800 Guardsmen. In November, finances required
returning the 101st Airborne detachment to Fort Campbell, and
the Guardsmen became the main presence on the scene. The
black students continued to be protected by a small contingent
of Guardsmen for the balance of the school year.
C. FEDERALIZING THE ALABAMA NATIONAL GUARD (1963).

A similar episode occurred on June 11, 1963, when Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama made his famous stand in
the schoolhouse door to prevent two black students, Vivian

41.
42.
43.
44.

Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 225 (cited in note 6).
Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 808 (cited in note 31).
Branch, Parting the Waters at 224 (cited in note 31).
Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 807 (cited in note 31).
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Malone and James Hood, from enrolling at the University of
Alabama. 45
The Kennedy Administration had been embarrassed when
it relied on Governor Ross Barnett and state officials to protect
James Meredith, who had registered as the first black student at
the University of Mississippi in the fall of the preceding year.
Federal marshals on the scene had been attacked by an armed
mob. In the five hours before being rescued by federal troops,
the marshals sustained more than two dozen gunshot wounds
and many cuts and contusions. A bystander and a newsman
were killed. It is understandable, therefore, that the Administration was jittery despite Governor Wallace's statement nine days
earlier on Meet the Press that, although "I shall stand at the door
as I stated in my campaign for Governor," the "confrontation
will be handled peacefully and without violence. "46
Even though Robert Kennedy made a special trip to Birmingham to ask him, Wallace would not tell Kennedy Administration officials exactly what he was planning. One source told
them that the "thing is greased" and that Wallace would "make
a gesture then step aside." 47 Another source reported Wallace
intended to stand in the door with members of the Alabama
Highway Patrol, who would be instructed to bar Malone and
Hood even if escorted by federal marshals. The Administration
decided to have troops ready if needed, and put General Creighton Abrams in charge of military planning.
Deputy Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach, who had
principal responsibility for the operation as a whole, told
Abrams he had no opinion about whether to use regular Army
or National Guard but that "it would probably be necessary to
48
federalize the Guard to take it away from Wallace's control."
Ultimately, Attorney General Robert Kennedy decided to use
the National Guard rather than regular army to avoid complaints about Yankee occupying forces.
45. For the description of the Tuscaloosa episode, I draw heavily on Dan T. Carter,
The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the
Transformation of American Politics 133-55 (Simon & Schuster, 1995), and Stephan
Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist 201-36 (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1994). I
also consulted E. Culpepper Oark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation's Last Stand at
the University of Alabama (Oxford U. Press, 1993); Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts at
334-40 (cited in note 31); Mahon, History of the Milita and National Guard at 237-38
(cited in note 6); Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 979-81 (cited in note 31).
46. Carter, The Politics of Rage at 137 (cited in note 45).
47. Clark, The Schoolhouse Door at 208 (cited in note 45).
48. Id.
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On the day of the confrontation, Wallace assembled a force
of seven hundred state troopers and National Guardsmen. As it
turned out, they were there for cosmetics. George Wallace was
a lot more savvy than Orval Faubus. Wallace knew exactly what
he wanted. It was not violence. It was good television.
The Kennedy Administration's strategy was to render the
doorway stand meaningless. The University had preregistered
the two students and assigned them to dormitories, so there was
no practical need for them to enter Foster Auditorium. Nevertheless, the Administration decided to allow Wallace to have his
show. Wallace painted a white line on the ground outside Foster
Auditorium, where students entered to register, and ensconced
himself in an office just inside the entrance.
Deputy Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach told the
press that the students would arrive at 10:00 A.M. When a lookout signaled that Katzenbach and the students had arrived, Wallace appeared on the front steps with a contingent of armed state
policemen in combat gear. A Wallace aide placed a classroom
lectern and microphone in front of the double doors at the main
entrance to Foster Auditorium, and Wallace took up position
behind the lectern. While Malone and Hood remained in the
cars, Katzenbach, flanked by the United States Attorney and
U.S. marshals, strode up to the lectern. Wallace raised his right
hand, as would a traffic cop ordering cars to stop. "I have a
proclamation from the President of the United States ordering
you to cease and desist from unlawful obstructions," stated
Katzenbach. 49 "I have come to ask you for unequivocal assurance that vou or anyone under your control will not bar these
students. ,5'o
Wallace did not respond. After an awkward silence,
Katzenbach tried to resume his statement, only to have Wallace
cut him off. "Now you make your statement, but we don't need
a speech." 51 After a few more sentences from Katzenbach, Wallace launched into a seven-minute speech denouncing the "unwarranted and force-induced intrusion upon the campus of the
University of Alabama of the might of the central government,"
with the climactic conclusion forbidding "this illegal and unwarranted action by the Central Government. " 52

49.
50.
51.
52.

Manchester, The Glory and the Dream at 980 (cited in note 31).
Carter, The Politics of Rage at 148 (cited in note 45).
ld. at 149.
Id.
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"I'm not interested in this show," Katzenbach replied, trying
to comply with the Attorney General's instructions to make
Wallace look foolish. "These students will remain on this campus," he continued. "They will register today. They will go to
school tomorrow." 53 The two men stood silently looking at one
another for a few moments; Katzenbach then turned and departed. This, as it turns out, was the scene that Wallace wanted.
The visual television image was of the Governor of Alabama
standing nose to nose with an representative of the federal government, with the Governor standing his ground and the federal
official retreating. Not everyone saw it this way, of course, but
many of Wallace's constituents did. Federal officials took
Malone and Hood to their dormitories. Later in the day, when
Malone sat alone in the University cafeteria about a half dozen
women students brought their food trays to her table, and smiling, sat down and introduced themselves.
When Katzenbach returned to his office, he recommended
nationalizing the Alabama National Guard, and the President
signed an executive order doing so shortly thereafter. The
Guard was placed under the immediate command of National
Guard General Henry V. Graham, who was in the real estate
business in Birmingham. Early in the afternoon, Graham met
with a Wallace aide, who assured him that if Wallace were allowed to read a second statement he would step aside without
trouble.
Graham passed this offer to General Creighton
Abrams, who in turn passed it on to the Attorney General, who
approved the deal.
Just before 3:00P.M. Graham arrived at the University with
a hundred now-federalized Guardsmen. Flanked by four armed
soldiers-and dressed in combat fatigues with the Confederate
battle flag of the 31st (Dixie) Division sewn over his pocketGraham strode up to Wallace's lectern, behind which the governor had repositioned himself. Graham saluted Wallace and said,
"Sir, it is my sad duty to ask you to step aside under orders from
the president of the United States." 54 Wallace returned the salute and said he wanted to make a statement. "Certainly, sir,"
responded Graham, who then stepped aside. "But for the unwarranted federalization of the National Guard, I would be your
commander-in-chief," said Wallace. "It is a bitter pill to swal-

53.
54.

Id.
See Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist at 233 (cited in note 45).
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low." 55 After a few additional remarks, Wallace honored his
word and walked away.
That night, President John F. Kennedy addressed the nation
on television. "Good evening, my fellow citizens," he began.
"This afternoon, following a series of threats and defiant statements, the presence of Alabama National Guardsmen was required on the University of Alabama [campus] to carry out the
final and unequivocal order of the United States District
Court." 56
D. THE MONTGOMERY AMENDMENT(1987)
In 1985, the federal government ordered more than 12,000
National Guardsmen for active duty training in Central America, principally Honduras. President Reagan wanted to use these
exercises to intimidate the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
with a show of force and to assist in developing a staging area for
a Contra-rebel invasion of Nicaragua. 57 At that time, federal
statutes permitted the Secretary of Defense to order members of
the National Guard to active duty outside the United States only
with the consent of the state's governor. A survey by the Congressional Research Service revealed that less than half the governors would approve training exercises in Honduras. When the
Reagan Administration proceeded with the program nonetheless, the governors of more than a dozen states (and the Iowa
legislature) balked, and the governors of California and Maine
successfully refused directives to send units there. 58
In response to what it viewed as a problem of allowing governors to veto National Guard training exercises outside the
United States, Congress enacted legislation known as the Montgomery Amendment. That statute authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to order National Guard members to active federal
duty for training for up to fifteen days a year notwithstanding a
gubernatorial objection on the .prounds of "location, purpose,
type, or schedule" of the duty. 5 The Governor of Minnesota
challenged the constitutionality of this legislation. 60 He argued
55. See Carter, The Politics of Rage at 150 (cited in note 45).
56. Id. at 152.
57. See Defending the Nation at 24 (cited in note 24).
58. Id.
59. 10 U.S. C. § 12301(f) (1994). Members of the reserve components, including the
Natwnal Guard, may be ordered to active duty without gubernatorial consent in times or
war or national emergency declared by Congress or a national emergency declared by
the President.lO U.S.C. §§ 12301(a) (1994), 12302(a) (1994).
60. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 337.
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that the Constitution only authorizes the federal government to
call forth the militia for three specific purposes, namely, to execute the laws of the United States, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions. Thus, he maintained, the federal government
could not nationalize the state militia for any other purpose, including training, without gubernatorial consent.
The Supreme Court declared the Act to be constitutional. 61
The Court's decision was grounded in the dual enlistment program established by Congress. Under this program, all members
of the National Guard simultaneously enroll in both their state's
National Guard and the National Guard of the United States
(NGUS). Under the structure established by Congress, NGUS is
part of the reserve component of the United States Armed
Forces. 62 Federal law expressly provides that when members of
the National Guard are ordered to active duty, they serve in
their capacity as reserves of the United States Army or Air
Force, as the case may be. 63 The Supreme Court held, therefore,
that because all of the members of the Minnesota National
Guard had voluntarily enrolled in NGUS, they could be ordered
to Honduras in that capacity. During periods of active duty service, NGUS members would be "temporarily disassociated"
from the state militia. 64
The Supreme Court found this plan constitutionally sound
because, it said, the militia clauses of the Constitution gave Congress additional military powers without in any fashion limiting
its authority to maintain an Army and a Navy. Congress can
draft citizens into the armed forces without regard to whether
they serve in a state militia. Thus, Congress can require dual enrollment and order militia members into active duty in their capacities as members of the federal armed forces notwithstanding
their militia membership.
The Governor of Minnesota argued that this interpretation
of the militia clauses nullified the state's authority over its militia. The Court rejected this argument, stating that its interpretation "merely recognizes the supremacy of federal power in the
area of military affairs." 65 Most significantly for our purposes,
the Court noted that because the Montgomery Amendment only
prohibited the governors from objecting to active duty assign61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
10 u.s.c. § 10101.
10 u.s.c. § 12403.
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 351.
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ments on the grounds of "location, purpose, type, or schedule,"
the Governor of Missouri could object to sending his state's National Guard to Honduras if that interfered with the state's ability to respond to local emergencies.
IV. ANALYZING THE CASE HISTORIES
Did the federal government violate the Second Amendment
in any of these four incidents? An examination of that question
begins with the observation that the Constitution appears to
guarantee states the right to a militia. While it does not do so
expressly, four constitutional provisions66 refer to the militia and
thus presuppose their existence, and one of the provisions gives
the states certain powers over the militia, including the right to
appoint officers of the militia. 67 These four sections are properly
read together. One of the things that the Second Amendment
adds is that the states not only have a right to militias but to
armed militias.
From its text and history, I believe we know the Second
Amendment guarantees the states the right to armed militias so
that they can provide for their own security. When the Second
Amendment was written, the South was not confident that Congress would react forcefully to quell slave insurrections in southern states. Indeed, the South was afraid Congress might actively
encourage slave revolts by disarming or otherwise compromising
the state militia. By writing the Second Amendment, Madison
sought to prohibit Congress from disarming the state militia. If
Congress tried to disarm the militia indirectly by simply not furnishing arms to the militia, the Second Amendment essentially
permits the state governments, or the people themselves, to supply the arms. 68
66. I refer to the provisions: (1) giving Congress the authority to call forth the mili·
tia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions (Art. I, §
8, cl. 15); (2) giving Congress the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and
govern them while in service of the United States, and-most significantly for these purposes-expressly reserving to the states the power to appoint officers and train the militia in accordance with the discipline established by Congress (Art. I, § 8, cl. 16); (3) making the President the Commander in Chief "of the militia of the several states" when
called into federal service (Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1); and (4) the Second Amendment.
67. Professor Tribe has noted that the Constitution presupposes "the existence of
the states as entities independent of the national government" because it refers to the
states and "expressly place[s]lirnits on the power of Congress in the interest of state sovereignty." Tribe specifically mentions the militia clauses in this connection. Laurence H.
Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 5-12 at 907 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed. 2000).
Similarly, the militia clauses presuppose state militias, or at least a state right to a militia.
68. Don Higginbotham, an authority on the eighteenth century militia, agrees. He
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I do not argue, however, that this right is absolute. No right
is absolute, whether belonging to an individual or a state. Moreover, the Constitution provides a sophisticated structure in
which the rights and obligations concerning the militia are divided between the federal and state governments. As previously
suggested, a state may have no right whatsoever to a militia if
Congress calls the entire militia into federal service to repel an
invasion, at least until danger has passed. It is less clear, however, whether the federal government can deprive a state of its
militia in less dire circumstances, or if so, under what circumstances or for how long.
Of the four incidents in Part III, the federal action that most
directly infringed on the states' right to an armed militia was the
first one, that is, depriving the southern states of their militia
during Reconstruction. The very purpose of the federal action
was to abridge the states' constitutionally guaranteed right to a
militia, especially an armed militia. But that does not necessary
mean the courts should have declared this to be unconstitutional.
Paradoxically, the federal government violated the letter of
the Second Amendment in order to effectuate its spirit. Ten
states had gone to war against the Union. That bloody war, with
its terrible passions, had ended less than two years earlier. The
terms of surrender at Appomattox Court House allowed Confederate officers to keep their guns. 69 Two days after Appomattox, President Lincoln gave a speech in which he told the nation
that though the war's end was cause for joy, the task of reconstruction was "fraught with great difficulty." 70 "No one man has
authorit7 to give up the rebellion for any other man," he observed.7 Three days later Lincoln was assassinated.
Andrew Johnson and Congress, to grossly understate it, did
not see eye to eye about Reconstruction. Congress took the position that the southern states had forfeited their constitutional
rights and that it was Congress's prerogative to decide when
those rights would be restored. 72 Johnson's desire for a more lewrites that "the amendment seems to imply that the concurrent power of the state and
federal governments over the militia will not threaten the states or obstruct their use of
the militia when not in federal service. Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia De·
bate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 Wm. & Mary Q. 39, 50
(1998).
.
69. See Paul Johnson, A History of the American People 494 (Harper Colhns,1998).
70. See Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln
423 (Harper & Row, 1977) (quoting Lincoln's speech).
71. Id.
72. Johnson, A History of the American People at 500 (cited in note 69).
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nient approach escalated into disputes that ultimately led to his
impeachment. The legislation prohibiting militia in the former
Confederate states was part of Congress's program of withholding the rights of the southern states until Congress believed it
prudent to restore them. Johnson disagreed with both Congress's policy generally and with this measure specifically. A
veto was unrealistic, however. The military ban was included in
legislation providing for the payment of Union soldiers; and
Johnson, an unelected president from the South, could not afford to be perceived as standing in the way of paying Union soldiers. Besides, Congress probably would have overridden the
veto, as it did with Johnson's vetoes of other Reconstruction legislation that he considers too harsh.
Much has been written about whether Congress was motivated by hatred and a desire to punish rather than reconstruct
the South, and about whether the Republican congressional majority was also influenced by a partisan desire to control the
South politically. Yet these were unique and difficult times. 73 A
civil war had just ended, and many within the southern states
remained bitter and hostile to the national government, as well
as to freedmen. In June 1866, a joint committee of Congress
charged with investigating conditions in the post-war South reported that the South was "in anarchy" and under the control of
"unrepentant ... rebels." 74 No court could properly have substituted its own evaluation for Congress's judgment that that former Confederate army units were reorganizing as militia units,
endangering the security of the reemerging states and their citizens. The question is whether, accepting the congressional findings on their face, suspending the states' right to militia was unconstitutional.
To answer that question, one must ask whether the government may properly exercise extraordinary powers during war or
other periods of crises. At least twice, the Supreme Court has
held that it may. During World War I, the Court upheld convic73. As Henry P. Monaghan observed, "A bloody Civil War, an event wholly unforeseen by the founding generation, may not be a fruitful source for deriving constitutional lessons." Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 27 (1993). That is certainly the case here. I ask whether the militia prohibition
violated the Second Amendment although Congress took the position that all states'
rights were in a period of suspension. Indeed, Congress ultimately established military
governments in what it called the "Rebel States." Nevertheless, to use this case history
as a tool for drawing lessons of general applicability about the Second Amendment, I
assume that constitutional normalcy was required to the greatest extent possible.
74. See Johnson, A History of the American People at 502 (cited in note 69).
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tions for making speeches and circulating flyers questioning the
government's war policies because they allegedly obstructed
military recruiting efforts. 75 In the World War II Japanese in76
terment cases, the Supreme Court more directly held that during war the government's power expands as necessity requires.
Writing for the Supreme Court in Korematsu, Hugo Black declared that the government's "power to ~rotect must be commensurate with the threatened danger." 7 Concurring, Felix
Frankfurter declared that "the validity of action under the war
power must be judged wholly in the context of war," and that an
action should not "be stigmatized as lawless because like action
in times of peace would be lawless." 78 In Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court invoked Charles Evans Hughes' famous phrase
that the "war power of the national government is 'the power to
wage successfully."' 79
The principle that the government's powers expand during
war or other grave emergencies is, however, extremely controversial. The confinement of Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World War has come to be considered a national
disgrace. In 1988, Congress enacted legislation formally apologizing for the internment and providing restitution to the individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned, 80 and the Supreme Court's decisions in the Japanese internment cases are
generally considered among its worst. 81 The government did not
75. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). The Supreme Court purported to
apply the same test used in peacetime. "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote for the Court. Schenck at 52. However, the Court accepted, without meaningful review, the government's allegation that
the defendants' statements created insubordination in the armed forces or obstructed
military recruiting or enlistment. "When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court no regard them as protected by any constitutional right" Holmes added. ld.
76. Korcmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 u.s. 81 (1943).
77. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
78. ld. at 224.
79. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
80. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989 et seq.
81. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, A Book of Legal Lists: The Best and Worst in
American Law with 100 Courc and Judge Trivia Questions 76-78 (Oxford U. Press, 1997)
(placing Korematsu number six among the ten worst Supreme Court decisions of all
time); J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 963, 1018 (1998) (listing Korematsu, together with Lochner v. New York and
Plessy v. Ferguson, as a case "that any theory worth its salt must show [to be] wrongly
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attempt to suppress civil liberties during the Vietnam War to the
same degree as it had during earlier engagements; 82 and when
the government asked the Supreme Court to enjoin the New
York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, classified
documents relating to origins of American involvement in Vietnam, the Court refused.
Perhaps the more liberal experience during the Vietnam
War was the result of a durable change in attitudes about suppressing civil liberties during wartime, influenced in part by
shame over the Japanese internment. It is at least as likely,
however, that the nation could simply afford a more liberal attitude because the Vietnam War never threatened American nationhood. When the nation's existence is in peril, the people will
expect their leaders to take extraordinary, and if necessary extralegal, measures. Even those who reject the principle that the
government's powers should be deemed to expand during war
acknowledge these realities. Laurence H. Tribe, for example,
writes that "[i]n retrospect, the Supreme Court's tolerance of
wartime excesses of Congress and the Executive seems wrong,
but in retrospect it is also clear that the Court saw no reasonable
alternative to deference." 83 The Court may believe deference is
required for the national safety, or it may believe that if the
Court intervenes it will be perceived as aiding and abetting an
enemy and destroy its own credibility in the eyes of the public. 84
Yet there is grave danger in legitimizing the principle that power
expands during national emergencies. If the courts were to sanction such a principle, they would give putative autocrats a tool
for unraveling the Constitution and seizing power. Crises can be
unscrupulously feigned, manufactured, or sustained. McCarthyesque figures can create paranoia without even the threat of
open warfare.

decided"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 94 (1994) (listing Korematsu, along with Plessy, as a quintessential
example of a case in which the Supreme Court yielded to popular prejudice only to look
foolish or short-sighted). Probably the most noteworthy dissenting view is that of Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who defends the Court's decisions in the internment cases.
William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (Knopf, 1998).
82. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War
on Drugs, 66 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1392-95 (1993).
83. Tribe, American Constitutional Law§ 5-18 at 966 (cited in note 67).
84. Another view, which is falling into increasing disfavor, is that courts should always defer to the political branches in all questions involving foreign affairs, generally by
mvokmg the pohtical questiOn doctnne. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton U.
Press, 1992).
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Surprisingly little has been written about whether the power
of the national government as a whole-that is, Congress and
the president acting together-expands during wartime or periods of dire emergency. Because the greatest fear is that of an
overreaching president, judicial opinions and scholarship have
most frequently focused on presidential power, and specifically
on whether the President can take military action without congressional approval. 85 Indeed, the phrase war power generally
refers to the scope of the president's power as commander in
chief of the army and navy-and, as useful to mention for our
purposes, "of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States" 86 -to send American
forces into combat without a congressional declaration of war.
Often the problem is whether the president may act with
tacit congressional approval, that is, with Congress not expressly
authorizing the military action but not taking action to terminate
it by, for example, cutting off funds. Nearly the reverse situation
occurred when Congress enacted legislative depriving the southern states of their militia during Reconstruction. President
Johnson signed the legislation despite his misgivings about its
constitutionality because the legislation also provided for paying
Union soldiers. (Johnson may have expected that Congress
would override his veto, thus earning him the enmity of Union
soldiers for no ultimate purpose.) Notwithstanding Johnson's
reluctance, Congress and the President did act together. The
question before us, therefore, is not whether one of the political
branches of the government infringed upon powers belonging to
the other but rather whether the federal government-at the
maximum extent of its power, based on the combined action of
Congress and the president and a situation of warlike exigencywas justified in temporarily abrogating the states' right to have
militia.
One might argue that the federal action was justified regardless of whether the government's powers were enlarged by
crisis. The argument runs as follows. The Second Amendment's
spirit should trump its letter. The Amendment's purpose is to
allow the states to provide for their own security, and the
Amendment therefore should be read as guaranteeing a state a
85. Sec, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Invasion of Panama and the Rule of Law, 26 Int'l
Law. 781 (1992); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale
L.J. 1385 ((1989); Charles Bennett, eta!., The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief
Versus Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 17 (1988).
86. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1.
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right to a militia only when a militia is, in fact, necessary for the
security of the state and its citizens. The preamble of the
Amendment lends special force to this argument. Because the
drafters expressly told us why they granted the right, we need
not worry about our failing to recognize the founders' objectives
and can feel confident about knowing when the right no longer
serves its intended purpose. 87 Thus, when for any reason the militia is not necessary for the security of a free state, the right
should be considered inactive or, as some commentators have
put it, "in suspension. " 88 The nation need not be at war or in crisis. If changed circumstances have eliminated the necessity of
the militia, the right may be considered suspended even during
periods of normalcy.
This argument is problematic however. While it is perfectly
sensible as a matter of constitutional theory to hold that time can
turn constitutional provisions into anachronisms, it is ticklish as a
practical matter to declare a right out of date. It would be one
thing if everyone agreed that a provision had outlived its usefulness (though almost by definition that is unlikely to arise in contested cases). It is quite another thing for a court to abrogate a
right because it finds we are now better off without it. Such a
court would be criticized for taking it upon itself to amend the
Constitution. 89
A more moderate approach would hold that the Second
Amendment right may be suspended when state control of a militia jeopardizes the security of the state or its citizens. Thus, the
right remains active as long as it serves the interests of security
or is simply benign. But the right may be suspended when it is
actively counterproductive. There should be a presumption that
the right remains active during periods of normalcy. The case
for suspending the right is strongest during relatively brief periods of crisis. And the case is strongest as well when Congress,
which has the constitutional authority to organize the militia,

87. Justice Scalia has cautioned about the hazards of abstracting a right from its
purposes and then eliminating that right because it finds the purposes arc served in other
ways. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). That concern is ameliorated when the Constitution expressly states that a right has been included
to serve a particular objective.
88. Uviller and Merkel, 76 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 560 (cited in note 3).
89. There may be a fine line between this and effectively amending the Constitution
by reinterpreting a provision in light of changed times and circumstances. Nevertheless,
there is a difference between a court modifying its interpretations of a provision and
snipping out the provision.
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and the President, who is commander in chief of the militia when
it is into national service, act together. 90
Congress prohibited militias in the ten former Confederate
States because it found them to endanger public security. It conducted an investigation. It found the southern states to be in
anarchy, and it found that the southern militias were being reconstituted from former Confederate Army units. Although in
normal circumstances the militia serves as a counterweight to
anarchy, Congress found that under these unusual and perilous
circumstances, the militias would endanger the stability of state
government (whether civilian or military) during the period of
Reconstruction.
Moreover, it does not appear that Congress had an alternative that would have allowed the southern states to have militias
without creating grave risks. Because states select the officers of
their militia, Congress may not have been able to ensure that militias were loyal to the United States. Restricting militia eligibility to those who had not served in the Confederate Army may
not have been a practical option, as presumably nearly every
white fit for military service served in that army. 91 Restricting
the militia to freed blacks would have been even more repugnant
to the founders' original intent than prohibiting the militia entirely. The specific concern that led to Madison's writing the
Second Amendment was the fear that Congress would disarm
the southern militias and thus leave the white population vulnerable to slave revolt. Although black citizens no longer needed to
revolt to secure their freedom, the white population, fearing retribution, would have been terrified of a black militia. 92 I con90. I leave aside the question of how much deference the Supreme Court ought to
give the political branches. Briefly, I believe the Supreme Court must take into account
political and practical exigencies, including the need of the political branches to act rapidly and decisively in emergencies. But I concur generally with view that the Court must
not abdicate its responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, and that, as Thomas M.
Franck has put it, "in our system a law that is not enforceable by adjudicatory process is
no law at all." Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers at 8 (cited in note 84).
91. Nearly one million men-90 percent of the able-bodied, adult, white population-served in the Confederate Army. See Johnson, A History of the American People
at 462, 466 (cited in note 69).
92. I am not suggesting that Madison and the founders' concern about slave control
should forever shape how we interpret the Second Amendment. They wrote the
Amendment in general terms, and the Amendment therefore did not expire with the end
of slavery. It will continue to have viability as long as there are threats to the security of
states and their citizens from any source. Nor I am suggesting that a black militia was a
greater threat to white citizens than a white militia was to black citizens. However, the
formation of black militias probably would have caused the formation of white paramilitary organizations (which, of course, eventually occurred with the Ku Klux Klan and
similar groups), frustrating reconstruction efforts.
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elude, therefore, that Congress did not violate the Second
Amendment by prohibiting militias in the ten Confederate
States during the early Reconstruction period.
Much of what has been said about the propriety of suspending a state's right to an armed militia during crisis applies to the
Little Rock and Tuscaloosa episodes as well. In each instance,
the President called up the state militia pursuant to a specific
constitutional warrant, that is, to execute the laws of the United
States, as decreed by federal courts. In each instance, there was
a crisis requiring federal military intervention. Although the
events did not rise to the level of wartime-like emergencies, they
were serious and presented challenges to the rule of law. President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas militia- the entire
state militia-not because he intended to use it as his instrument
for directly executing the laws (he relied on 101 51 Airborne units
and U.S. marshals for that) but to deprive the state's governor of
its use. That was legitimate; once the president decided to dispatch federal personnel, it was only proper that he try to reduce
the risks of hostile actions that might threaten federal personnel
or interfere with their mission. By calling the Arkansas National
Guard into federal service, President Eisenhower was seeking to
preserve peace and security in Arkansas, not threatening it.
Wallace's stand in the schoolhouse door presents other interesting features. As it turned out, the federalization of the
Alabama National Guard had little military significance but potent political significance. For one thing, the doorway stand was
purely symbolic. And the federal government probably would
have had little difficulty protecting Malone and Hood without
calling up the Guard. Yet somehow federalization of the Guard
ended the crisis (or perhaps, in this case, faux crisis). The denouement of the episode was General Graham's saluting the
Governor and informing him that he and the state Guard were
now in the service of the President of the United States. Surely
this was not because this dissolved the possibility of U.S. Armed
Forces and Alabama National Guard going to war with each
other. That was not remotely within the realm of possibility.
Was it because nationalizing the Guard somehow tangibly demonstrated the supremacy of federal authority? Was it because
depriving the Governor of his use of the Guard somehow politically emasculated him? The national government's ability to
federalize-or the state's ability to retain-the militia are political as well as military assets. In considering whether the national
government can properly deprive a state of its militia in some fu-
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ture scenario, it may be relevant to consider the psychological
and political ramifications as well as purely military issues.
What if in a time of crisis a benevolent governor needed her
state's militia to preserve peace and order and a malevolent
president, desiring uncontrolled riotin~, federalized the militia
and confined them to their armories? 9 In that case, we might
regret precedents approving the federalization of state militias to
deprive governors of their use. The courts provide the only institutional check on this kind of misuse of power, although a far
from perfect check it must necessarily be. Courts must generally
defer to the judgment of the political branches in time of crisis;
often the best they can do is to condemn actions after the fact. 94
Issues involving the Second Amendment and the militia are not
unique in this respect. During an emergency, however, the
president must have the ability to call the militia into federal
service, against the governor's wishes if need be. Since the Civil
War, it is clearly unacceptable for state forces to clash militarily
with federal forces. We should not, therefore, read the Second
Amendment as an impediment avoiding such conflicts by the
president's exercise of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief.
The battle between the governors and the Reagan Administration over sending National Guard units to Central America,
and the subsequent enactment of the Montgomery Amendment,
raise other issues. As a practical matter, the federal government
can deprive a state of its armed militia by sending it away. The
anti-Federalists raised this specific concern when they argued
that the Constitution gave the federal government too much
power over the state militia. 95 Federal statutes now give the
President and the Secretary of State considerable powers to call
the militia into federal service. The Secretary may call up the
militia during a war or national emergency declared by Congress, and the militia forces may remain in federal service for the
duration of the war or emergency plus six months. 96 The Secretary may call up the militia during a national emergency declared
93. As Garry Wills observes, however, history has shown that abuse of individual
rights and peccancy tend to thrive more at the local level, and the federal government has
often been the rescuer of the weak abused by the powerful. See Garry Wills, A Necessary Evil: A History of Distrust of Government 110 (Simon & Schuster, 1999).
94. By invoking the political question doctrine, as first articulated in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), courts may escape condemning improper action after the
fact as well.
95. See Bogus, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 344-54 (cited in note 12).
96. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) (1994).
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by the President, but in this case the militia forces may be retained in federal service for no more than twenty-four consecutive months. 97 Finally, and most broadly, the Secretary of Defense may call up the militia whenever "the President
determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for
any operational mission[.] " 98
The militia may be called into federal service "to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. " 99 Once called into federal service for such a purpose, the
President, as commander-in-chief, can send militia forces where
she sees fit. If, for example, hostile forces were to invade Seattle, the President could send the entire Massachusetts National
Guard to Washington State to repel the invasion, even if this
were to reduce internal security within Massachusetts. The security of the nation transcends that of individual states. And although the language of the Constitution seems to contemplate
the militia being used only domestically to "suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions," a reasonable interpretation of the
President's war power would allow him to send militia forces
into British Columbia if that were required for effective military
operations. Nor, at least under Supreme Court precedents,
would it be problematic for the President to send part of the
Massachusetts National Guard to some distant locale for training
purposes. 100
However, if the Second Amendment is properly read as
guaranteeing states some minimum right to an armed militia, the
President, even with Congress's consent, would not be authorized in sending the entire Massachusetts Guard to some distant
locale for training or some other non-emergency purpose, especially if this left Massachusetts vulnerable to an internal threat.
This does not mean that Congress cannot organize the militia as
it has, in making every member of the Massachusetts National
Guard is also a member of the reserve forces of the United
States. But Congress should not be able to use this method of
organization to deprive a state of its right to an armed militia.
That is, each member of the Massachusetts National Guard may
be ordered-in his or her capacity as a member of the reserve
97.
98.
99.

Id. § 12302(a) (1994).
Id. § 12304(a) (1994).
U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, d. 15.
100. A student commentator has persuasively argued that the Constitution exclusively reserves to the states the authority to train the militia. See Monte M.F. Cooper,
Perp1ch v. Department of Defense: Federalism Values and the Militia Clause, 62 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 637 (1991).
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forces of the United States-to training exercises in Washington
State; the problem arises when every member of the Massachusetts Guard is so dispatched. That is not what occurred in the
events giving rise to Perpich however. In this scenario, too,
therefore, the states' Second Amendment rights were not violated.
I have argued that, except in extreme circumstances, the
Second Amendment provides the states with some minimum
right to an armed militia. What are the parameters of that right?
How large a militia-in absolute numbers or in proportion to
population-is a state entitled to? What types and numbers of
arms does a state militia have a right to possess? Those questions cannot be answered in the abstract. The Second Amendment sets forth a principle, not a formula. The parameters of the
right can only sensibly be mapped on a case by case basis.
Perhaps the need to do so will never arise. At this writing,
no such clash between federal and state governments appears on
the horizon. But we do not have a crystal ball. When the Constitution was written, the southern states genuinely feared the
prospect of the federal government deliberately attempting to
deny them armed militias. 101 It is perhaps no coincidence that
concerns about the federal government undermining the slave
system led to the Second Amendment, and that the first three of
these case histories are part of slavery's legacy. Issues creating
distrust and dissension between the federal and state governments may be very different in the future. No one can foresee
what those issues may be. Under a collective rights interpretation, however, the Second Amendment remains a vital constitutional provision. It is a discrete but important element of federalism, guaranteeing the states not only a right but the capacity to
provide for their own security.

101. It bears mentioning that when the Second Amendment was enacted, the militia
constituted the state's exclusive instrument of armed force. Police forces did not exist
until the early nineteenth century. See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1365, 1378-80 (1993). Today, of course, police help protect a state from riots or
other internal disruptions. Thus, when considering whether a state's security may be
jeopardized by depriving it of its militia, it is appropriate to consider that the availability
of police.

